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Abstract
Congestion games model self-interested agents competing for resources in communication networks. The
price of anarchy quantifies the deterioration in performance in such games compared to the optimal solu-
tion. Recent research has shown that, when the social cost is defined as the maximum cost of all players,
specific graph topologies impose a bound on the price of anarchy. We extend this research by providing
bounds on the price of anarchy for congestion games on series-parallel networks. First we show that par-
allel composition does not increase the price of anarchy. This result is then used to show that the price of
anarchy is bounded above by both the diameter of the graph and the number of players in the game, and
that these bounds are tight. Finally we identify an important aspect of proofs for bounds on the price of
anarchy: when a bound is achieved by restricting multiple parameters of the game, one should also prove
that this bound cannot be realized using only a subset of these restrictions.
1 Introduction
The optimality of solutions given by most classical optimization algorithms relies critically on the fact that
all parties involved are interested in achieving the same objective: to achieve a common optimal solution.
However, in many cases individual participants (or agents) are interested in optimising their individual
objectives. Agents displaying such behaviour are called selfish: they only care about their own performance,
regardless of what the effect on the entire system may be. The presence of selfish agents into a system can
severely degrade its global performance.
For an example of the effects of selfish behaviour, consider internet routing. When downloading a file
over the internet from a single source, the packets that constitute the file should be delivered as quickly
as possible. The global objective is to minimise the time it takes for the latest packet to arrive, while the
individual agents want their packets to be delivered as fast as possible. In order to avoid congestion, some
packets will be redirected along routes that take far more time than the shortest possible link. By redirecting
some packets, the routing algorithm averts congestion, thus ensuring that the maximum travelling time for a
packet remains low.
However, the packets ordered to take the longer route can improve their performance by ignoring the
command to reroute and continue along the shortest link anyway. If they act selfishly like this, their own
delivery times speed up, but the additional load may cause the shortest link to become congested. This
in turn negatively affects the delivery time of all other packets, thereby decreasing the performance of the
system as a whole.
Depending on the problem, there may be different ways to reduce the effect of selfishness on the overall
optimality of the solution. In order to compare the relative merits of these different approaches, Papadim-
itriou et al. introduce the notion of the price of anarchy [10], defined as the ratio between the global perfor-
mance in the worst-case Nash equilibrium and the global performance in the optimal solution. A solution is
said to be a Nash equilibrium when no agent can unilaterally improve its result.
This measure is closely related to the approximation ratio for approximation algorithms and the com-
petitive ratio for online algorithms [5]: The approximation ratio quantifies the price we pay in terms of
optimality when heuristics are used to approximate hard problems in polynomial time. Likewise, the com-
petitive ratio quantifies the price of dealing with incomplete information in online situations. Finally, the
price of anarchy (or coordination ratio) allows us to quantify the effect of the lack of coordination between
selfish agents.
The price of anarchy varies depending on the exact characteristics of the problem. These characteristics
include the topology of the graph, the exact definition of “performance” and various properties of the agents
themselves.
In this paper we concentrate on the price of anarchy of network routing modelled as a congestion game.
An interesting result in this field is Braess’s paradox [3]: the observation that adding an edge to a network
can result in a higher price of anarchy, leading to worse performance. Since the price of anarchy can be
unbounded in general graphs [12], researchers seek alternative ways to bound the price of anarchy.
Quite some research concentrates on the total latency of the system, defined as the sum of the latencies of
all players. For arbitrary latency functions, Roughgarden [12] shows that the price of anarchy is unbounded,
while the bound is 43 when only linear latency functions are used.
Roughgarden concentrates on non-atomic network flow. Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [4] on the other
hand study networks with linear latency functions for atomic network flow. They show that the price of
anarchy is 5n−22n+1 for symmetric games. When the social cost is defined as the maximum cost of a player (as
in this paper), they show that the price of anarchy for symmetric games is 52 .
Another way to bound the price of anarchy is to restrict the network topology [6, 7]. Epstein et al. follow
this approach to determine what network topologies are efficient, i.e. for which every Nash equilibrium is
socially optimal [6]. They show that series-parallel graphs are efficient only in bottleneck routing games, that
is, when the social cost is determined by the maximum cost of any player on any edge. This definition of the
social cost is particularly relevant in communication networks [1]. They also show that so-called extension-
parallel graphs, a restricted subset of series-parallel graphs, are efficient for both bottleneck routing and
network congestion games. When the social cost is defined as the total cost of all players, Fotakis [7] shows
that the price of anarchy in an extension-parallel graph is bounded by the price of anarchy for non-atomic
congestion games.
In a different approach, the price of anarchy is not analysed as a property of the game itself, but rather
as a value to be optimized by guiding the agents [2, 8, 13, 14]. In this case a central authority, aware
of the optimal solution, tries to guide the agents to follow that solution. This can be accomplished by
assigning a fraction of the (non-atomic) agents to a specific route, as is done with Stackelberg routing by
Roughgarden in [11], who uses the analysis of Korilis et al. [8]. Another approach is to modify the cost
functions in the network. Christodoulou et al. introduce a coordination mechanism as a means of bounding
the price of anarchy [5]. In an example with selfish task allocation, represented as an asymmetric parallel






3m . Unfortunately, their mechanism is not applicable to general (symmetric) singe-commodity
congestion games.
Our results We study atomic routing games on series-parallel graphs, with the social cost defined as the
maximum of the costs of all players. For games with these properties, we show that the price of anarchy
is bounded in both the number of players and the diameter of the graph. We note that Christodoulou et al.
[5] present a coordination mechanism that achieves the same bound, while in our research we discover that
this bound is a property of the graph topology. Furthermore, we show that parallel composition does not
increase the price of anarchy, which is a generalisation of the work by Epstein et al. [6].
Organisation The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we introduce the model and
notation used. We then provide the upper bounds on the price of anarchy in series-parallel graphs in section
3 and provide an example which shows that these bounds are tight. Finally, we present our conclusions and
suggestions for future work in section 4.
2 The model
We denote a symmetric congestion game with n players as the tuple Λ = (N, {Σi}i∈N , {ci(·)}i∈N ). Each
player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} = N is associated with a set of strategies Σi. The cost of the player i is defined by
the cost function ci(·), which maps a strategy Si ∈ Σi to a value. The n-tuple S = (S1, . . . , Sn) denotes
the joint action taken by the players. We refer to the actions of the players other than i as S−i.
A game Λ is associated with a directed graph G = (V,E), in which edges E represent the resources the
players compete for. We consider atomic single-commodity games, so all players have one unsplittable unit
of flow they want to route from a source s ∈ V to a destination t ∈ V . The allowed strategies Σi of a player
s1G1 t1 s1G2 t1
(a) Components G1 and G2
s t
(b) Series composition G = G1 → G2
s t
(c) Parallel composition G = G1||G2
Figure 1: Composition of series-parallel graphs. Nodes with dashed borders were merged in a composition step.
consist of the set of simple paths in G between s and t. Because for the cases handled in this paper we use
a symmetric strategy system, we have Σi = Σ for all players.
Each edge has a non-decreasing cost function `e(k), representing the cost (or latency) of the edge when
it is used by k players. The cost of a facility is the same for all players using it, and depends only on the
number of players k. We denote the number of players using an edge e in a given joint strategy S by ne(S).
We define the cost c(Si, S−i) of a player to be the sum of the costs of the edges in the path Si that it uses,
given the strategies S−i of the players in the game, so c(Si, S−i) =
∑
e∈Si `e(ne(Si ∪ S−i)). Given a joint
action S−i of all players other than i, the best response Si of this player is defined as argminSi∈Σ c(Si, S−i).
The player with the maximum cost defines the social cost scΛ(S) = maxi c(Si, S−i). For a given congestion
game Λ, we want to minimize this social cost.
In this paper we compare pure Nash equilibria in congestion games to the social optimum OPT . This
optimum does not need to be a Nash equilibrium itself, therefore OPT (Λ) = minS∈Σ scΛ(S). The ratio
between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum is called the price of anarchy [9].
Series-parallel graphs Series-parallel (SP) graphs form a class of graphs with a simple network topology.
Each SP graph has two special nodes, called terminals: a source s and a sink t. Using the two terminals as
reference, an SP-graph G can be defined recursively, as follows:
1. A graph G consisting of only the source s, the sink t and a single edge connecting them is a series-
parallel graph.
2. Given two series-parallel graphs G1 and G2, their series composition G = G1 → G2 is an SP graph
as well. The series composition G is obtained by merging the sink t1 of G1 with the source s2 of G2.
3. Given two series-parallel graphs G1 and G2, their parallel composition G = G1||G2 is an SP-graph.
To obtain the parallel composition G, merge the two sources s1 and s2 into a single source node s and
merge the two sinks in the same way.
Figure 1 illustrates the series and parallel composition steps.
3 Bounding the price of anarchy in series-parallel graphs
In [5], Christodoulou et al. present a coordination mechanism that places an upper bound of n on the price
of anarchy in congestion games. In this mechanism, a designer with knowledge of the optimal solution
modifies the cost functions in the network, such that the participating agents will only consider the edges
used by the optimal solution. However, in general graphs the resulting strategy selection still need not be
optimal, since the number of agents choosing each of those edges may still differ from that in the optimal
solution. So, while this mechanism is not applicable to general graphs, Christodoulou et al. were able to
show that their mechanism could be applied to ensure a bound of n in series-parallel graphs.
In this section we show that this bound is an inherent property of series parallel graphs, that is, the
bound holds even if no coordination mechanism is used at all. This illustrates the fact that adjusting the cost
functions and restricting the topology of a problem can independently affect the price of anarchy. Therefore,
when multiple aspects of the problem are changed simultaneously, one should always make sure that each of
these changes is indeed required to achieve the desired bound, and that the same bound can not be achieved
by a subset of the suggested changes.
In order to prove our bound, we first prove that parallel composition does not increase the price of anarchy.
Specifically, assume that for any symmetric network routing game Λ on the networks G1 and G2, for any
joint action of the players, the cost of the best response strategy of any player is at most f times the optimal
social cost. In that case we show that for any joint action of the players in the game Λ, the cost of the best
response strategy of any player is at most f times the optimal social cost. This statement is made precise in
lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1. For j ∈ {1, 2}, let Pi,j be the best response of any player i to the joint action (Sj)−i of the
players in the symmetric network routing game Λj on the SP graph Gj . Furthermore, let Pi be the best
response of any player i to the joint action S−i of the players in the symmetric network routing game Λ
on the graph G = G1||G2. Then, if c(Pi,j , (Sj)−i) ≤ f · OPT (Λj) (where j ∈ {1, 2}) it must hold that
c(Pi, S−i) ≤ f ·OPT (Λ).
As mentioned before, intuitively this lemma states that parallel composition does not increase the price
of anarchy. The proof given below is a generalisation of the proof given by Epstein et al. [6], who prove this
lemma for f = 1.
Proof of lemma 3.1. Let S∗ be the optimal joint action of the players in G, such that OPT (Λ) = scΛ(S∗).
Let T ∗j be the set of players using paths in Gj according to S
∗, and let x∗j = |T ∗j |, for j ∈ {1, 2}. Finally, let
S be any (other) joint action, let Tj be the set of players using paths in Gj according to S, and let xj = |Tj |.
Now, there are two cases:
Case 1: x1 = x∗1. In this case the same number of players selects the upper parallel part (G1) in solution
S as in the optimum solution S∗, and (therefore) the same number of players selects the lower parallel part
(G2) as well.
Let Λ1 be a symmetric network routing game on the symmetric network G1, with players T1 and the
original edge cost functions. Define Λ2 and T2 analogously for the network G2. Now let S′ and S′′ be the
joint action induced by S of the players in T1 and T2 respectively.
Using the assumption on the network G1 stated in the lemma, for every player i in the game Λ1 with
a best response P ′i to S
′




−i) ≤ f · OPT (Λ1). Following the same reasoning for Λ2
shows that c(P ′′i , S
′′
−i) ≤ f ·OPT (Λ2) for any player i in game Λ2 with best response P ′′i to S′′−i.
Because we assumed that the number of players using any component j is the same in both the optimal
solution and in any other solution, it follows that OPT (Λj) ≤ OPT (Λ) for j ∈ {1, 2}. After all, in both
games the same number of players have to use each component, so the optimal solution in the composite
game Λ cannot have costs on a component j lower than the costs in the optimal solution for the component
game Λj .
Now let Pi be player i’s best response to S−i in Λ. Since Pi is a best response, it holds for any player
i ∈ T1 that c(Pi, S−i) ≤ c(P ′i , S−i) for every P ′i . Also, because S′ is the response induced by S in G1, it





In combination with the inequalities obtained above, this allows the following derivation:
c(Pi, S−i) ≤ c(P ′i , S−i) (1a)
= c(P ′i , S
′
−i) (1b)
≤ f ·OPT (Λ1) (1c)
≤ f ·OPT (Λ) (1d)
In this derivation equation 1a holds because Pi is the best response to Si, equation 1b holds because S′
are the actions of the players in T1 induced by S, equation 1c uses the assumption from the formulation of
the lemma and equation 1d is true since OPT (Λ1) ≤ OPT (Λ).
The same line of reasoning can be used for Λ2, by substituting Λ1, S′, P ′i and T1 with Λ2, S
′′, P ′′i and
T2 respectively. Since the derivation holds for players in both T1 and T2, the lemma holds in this case.
Case 2: There exists a network Gj for which x∗j > xj . In this case one of the components is used by
more players in the solution S than in the optimal solution S∗. Conversely, the other component is used by
less players in S than in S∗.
W.l.o.g. suppose x∗1 > x1. Consider an arbitrary player i. Let x
′
1 = |T1 ∪ {i}|, which yields x∗1 ≥
x1 + 1 ≥ x′1. Let Λ1 be a symmetric network routing game on the symmetric network G1 with players T1
and the original edge cost functions. Now let S′ be the joint action of the players in T1 ∪ {i} induced by S.
Since x∗1 ≥ x′1, we have that OPT (Λ1) ≤ OPT (Λ). After all, there are at least as many player using
component G1 in game Λ as there are players using that component in Λ1. Therefore, if OPT (Λ1) were
greater than OPT (Λ), the players in Λ1 could simply adapt the cheapest strategies from Λ and come out
ahead: Since there are no more players in Λ1 than in Λ, the cost to pay would be less or equal. This would
contradict the optimality of OPT (Λ1), so indeed it must hold that OPT (Λ1) ≤ OPT (Λ).
By the assumption on the network G1, for every player i in the game Λ1 with a best response Pi to S′−i, it
holds that c(P ′i , S
′
−i) ≤ f ·OPT (Λ1). Using the inequality above it follows that c(P ′i , S′−i) ≤ f ·OPT (Λ).
Now let Pi be player i’s best response to S−i in Λ. Since Pi is a best response, it holds for any player
in i ∈ T1 that c(Pi, S−i) ≤ c(P ′i , S−i). Also, because S′ is the response induced by S in G1, it holds that





In combination with the inequalities obtained above, this allows the same derivation as in case 1:
c(Pi, S−i) ≤ c(P ′i , S−i) (2a)
= c(P ′i , S
′
−i) (2b)
≤ f ·OPT (Λ1) (2c)
≤ f ·OPT (Λ) (2d)
Again, equation 2a holds because Pi is the best response to Si, equation 2b holds because S′ are the
actions of the players in T1 ∪ {i} induced by S, equation 2c uses the assumption from the formulation of
the lemma and equation 2d is true since OPT (Λ1) ≤ OPT (Λ). Since player i was selected arbitrarily, the
lemma holds in this case.
Since cases 1 and 2 constitute an exhaustive listing of possibilities, we conclude that the lemma holds.
Now that we have shown that parallel composition does not increase the price of anarchy, we can con-
centrate on bounds that are dominated by series composition. A property that comes to mind immediately
is the diameter of the graph. Since the diameter of a graph grows linearly with the diameter of the serial
components, and considering that intuitively the price of anarchy is dependent on the independency of serial
components, one would expect the price of anarchy to grow with the diameter of the graph. We show here
that the price of anarchy does not grow faster than the diameter of the graph.
Theorem 3.2. Let Λ be a symmetric network congestion game on an SP network G. Consider the joint action
for the worst-case Nash equilibrium S ∈ Σ. Let d(G) be the diameter of G. Then scΛ(S) ≤ d(G)·OPT (Λ).
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction on the network size |E|. Let Λ be a symmetric network game on
an SP network G(V,E). For |E| = 1 the claim holds trivially. In what follows we show that this property is
preserved under series and parallel compositions.
Series composition. Suppose the network G = G1 → G2 is a series composition of the SP networks G1
and G2. Let Λj be the symmetric network congestion game on the symmetric network Gj with the original
players and original edge cost functions, for j ∈ {1, 2}. Let Sj be the joined action of the players for the
worst-case Nash equilibrium in Λj .
Assuming as induction hypothesis that the theorem holds for the components separately, consider the
following derivation:
scΛ(S) ≤ scΛ(S1) + scΛ(S2) (3a)
≤ d(G1) ·OPT (Λ1) + d(G2) ·OPT (Λ2) (3b)
≤ d(G1) ·OPT (Λ) + d(G2) ·OPT (Λ) (3c)
= (d(G1) + d(G2))OPT (Λ) (3d)
= d(G) ·OPT (Λ) (3e)
Inequality 3a follows from the assumption that we are considering the worst-case Nash equilibria; the
social cost of S can not be worse than the concatenation of the strategies dominating scΛ(S1) and scΛ(S2)
Otherwise there would have to be a path in either part with a higher cost, which would contradict the
definition of worst-case Nash equilibria. Inequality 3b follows from the induction hypotheses, and 3c from
the fact that the optimum in either part is not greater than the optimum of the complete graph. Otherwise
there would exist a path with lower cost in one of the parts, contradicting the definition of optimum.
Parallel composition. Follows from lemma 3.1, by substituting f = d(G).
In order to prove that the price of anarchy is bounded by the number of players, we need a measure to
bound the social cost for series composition of the graph. The most expensive combination of edges forming
a simple s-t-path, using the edge-costs as incurred by S∗, is such a measure. We will first show that this
measure is bounded above by n ·OPT (Λ).
Lemma 3.3. Let Λ be a symmetric network congestion game on an SP network G with source s and sink
























= n ·OPT (Λ) (4c)
Equation 4a states that the most expensive combination of edges, using the costs incurred by applying
joint action S∗, is not greater than the sum of all costs incurred by that joint action. This is smaller than the
number of players, n, times the most expensive path in the joint action, as described in equation 4b. And,
since the most expensive path is the definition of social cost, equation 4c follows from the definitions of
social cost and optimum.
Next we will show that the bound on the social cost of the cost of the most expensive simple s-t-path is
maintained under series composition.









Proof. Suppose the network G = G1 → G2 is a series composition of the SP networks G1 and G2. Let
Λj be the symmetric network congestion game on the symmetric network Gj with the original players and
original edge cost functions, for j ∈ {1, 2}. Let S∗ be the optimal joint action, i.e., OPT (Λ) = costΛ(S∗),
then:




















The inequality 5a follows from the assumption that we consider worst-case Nash equilibria. If scΛ(S)
would be worse than the sum of the partial social costs, there must be a player in the composition that suffers
a cost on a component that is higher than when the component was considered alone. This would contradict
the definition of worst-case Nash equilibria. Inequality 5b follows from the assumption of the lemma. The
last inequality follows from concatenating the most expensive combination of edges in both parts. If this
would not hold, a more expensive path would have to exist in one of the parts, contradicting the definition
of the maximum.
Now we can continue to define the second bound on the price of anarchy.
Theorem 3.5. Let Λ be a symmetric network congestion game on an SP network G. Consider the joint
action for the worst-case Nash equilibrium S with Si ∈ Σ. Then scΛ(S) ≤ n · OPT (Λ), where n is the
number of players in G.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the network size |E|. Let Λ be a symmetric network game on
an SP network G(V,E). For |E| = 1 the claim holds trivially. In what follows we show that this property is










Figure 2: Congestion game for three players with price of anarchy n. In the optimum solution player i takes the ith lower edge and
upper edges elsewhere, for a social cost of a. In the worst-case Nash equilibrium two players take the upper edges, and the
third player determines the social cost of 3a. (Example reproduced from [5].)
Series composition. We observe that for the base case, with |E| = 1, the condition of lemma 3.4 is














≤ n ·OPT (Λ) (7b)
So it follows that the theorem holds for series composition.
Parallel composition. Follows from lemma 3.1, by substituting f = n.
We summarize the results of both theorems presented in this paper in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.6. The price of anarchy for general series parallel graphs is bounded above in both the diameter
of the graph and the number of players in the game.
Proof. Follows trivially from theorem 3.2 and theorem 3.5.
We use the network in figure 2 to prove that these bounds are tight. The optimal set of strategies results
in a social cost of a. On the other hand the worst-case Nash equilibrium for this example gives a social cost
of 3 · a. With n = 3 as well as d = 3 this example is an instance that realizes the bounds from theorem 3.6.
The bounds presented in this paper are therefore tight.
4 Conclusions and future research
In this paper we have shown that the price of anarchy in series-parallel graphs is bounded above in both the
diameter of the graph and the number of players. We have also shown that the price of anarchy in series-
parallel graphs does not increase under parallel composition. These results hold for atomic games in which
the social cost is the maximum cost over all players. Earlier research showed that when we study the total
or average cost of non-atomic players, the price of anarchy is unbounded regardless of the topology of the
graph [12].
Our results put an upper bound on the price of anarchy in series-parallel graphs. One might ask whether
this bound can be improved if we adjust the cost functions of the network edges. Christodoulou et al.
[5] showed that no symmetric coordination mechanism is able to reduce the price of anarchy of a general
series-parallel graph further than n or d. But although we have shown that their coordination mechanism
for series-parallel graphs does not reduce the upper bound on the price of anarchy in general, it could still
be the case that a coordination mechanism exists that lowers the price of anarchy for specific instances.
Furthermore, it remains an open problem whether a symmetric coordination mechanism exists that achieves
that bound in general graphs. More research is warranted on these subjects.
When designing a network, one could also consider enforcing restrictions on the topology of the graph.
This gives the designer the guarantee of a bounded price of anarchy, without needing mechanisms to achieve
a bound. When considering extension-parallel graphs instead of series-parallel graphs, Epstein et al. [6]
showed that the price of anarchy for such graphs is one. In many applications however, it is infeasible to
change the topology of the network. Therefore, if a series-parallel graph topology is given, other methods
(for example Stackelberg routing [2, 8, 13, 14]) are needed when a price of anarchy lower than n or d is
desired.
In the search for better bounds on the price of anarchy, sometimes several parameters of the underlying
game need to be restricted in order to prove a bound for a specific case. We have shown in this paper that
in such cases one should be very careful what the exact effects of subsets of those restrictions are. In order
to fully prove the necessity of the full set of restrictions, it should therefore also be shown that no subset of
restrictions is sufficient to prove the bound. In the particular case described in this paper we have shown
that the effects of restricting the graph topology have a considerable effect on the price of anarchy of the
underlying graph.
Apart from graph topology, we have seen that the price of anarchy also depends heavily on other prop-
erties of the game such as the class of cost functions, the topology of the underlying network, the definition
of the social cost and whether traffic is splittable. Many combinations of these properties have been docu-
mented in the literature, but an overview of the bounds is missing, even though it could be of great help to
anyone studying the price of anarchy in a certain network.
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